General Pratt of the 101st Airborne was initially supposed to land with elements of the 101st Airborne and arrives on Utah Beach during the afternoon of D-Day.
Prior to General Pratt's jump, however, General Maxwell D. Taylor persuaded Pratt to join the first wave of gliders to land in Normandy, instead.
Hiesville, General Pratt Memorial
Pratt would have preferred to jump with his men, but he had not completed the necessary training to qualify him to make a parachute jump at the time.
Unknown to Pratt, his glider was seriously overloaded, and it crashed in a field at the site of this memorial.
He was the first United States General to be killed in action during the Invasion.
From left to the right: 1st Lt Lee J. MAY, co-pilot. Brig. Gen. Donald F. PRATT, Assistant Division Commander of Gen. Maxwell TAYLOR Commanding the 101st Airborne. Lt Col. «Mike» MURPHY, pilot. Lt John M. BUTLER, aide de camp, facing The Fighting Falcon in England on June 5th 1944.
General Maxwell Taylor HQ, Hiesville
Le Cauday's farmhouse is north of Vierville-au-Plain and outside the hamlet of Hiesville, that was the first Headquarters of General Maxwell Taylor, Commander of the 101st Airborne. General Taylor kept his Headquarters at this location for 8 days following June 6th, 1944. If you look carefully in between the two chimneys is an antenna that was placed there by an Airborne Pathfinder who jumped into Normandy a couple of hours before the majority of the troops from the 101st and 82nd came in. The job of the Pathfinders was to set up radio and light beacons to guide the C-47s to their drop zones.
First American surgical hospital.
Monument at Château de Colombière.
There are two good stories about the Pathfinder who landed here. One has him landing on the roof, which probably isn't the case. The other has him landing right near the house, and the landing and dropping his chute, etc., caused a bit of noise and a little boy who lived in the house came out to see what caused the commotion. The trooper didn't speak French, but he put his finger to his mouth and went «chuuuut». The boy led him into the house where he went up on the roof and put up his beacon.
Exhausted, the trooper collapsed in an empty bed in the house. He woke up to a violent kicking of the bed in the morning and looked and saw an American officer there who told him to get out of the house. It turns out that they commandeered the place for General Taylor, the commander of the 101st and they didn't want some trooper in his bed.
The family there at the time left up the antenna and placed that memorial Airborne plaque on their gatepost. When leaving this stop you can visit the sight of the First Allied Surgical Hospital at Château de Colombière.
Through the hedgerows we could hear voices. I couldn't tell if they were German or American voices. «Flash» had been designated as our password. From behind a tree came a challenge - Flash! The immediate reply was «Flash, Hell! This is Col. Maloney the Executive Officer of the Regiment». Instantly we knew we were among friends.
Roy Creek Bridge
Troopers kept drifting in and our force was growing. Men came from all units of the 82nd airborne Division and some from the 101st Airborne. Nothing of consequence happened and soon it was dawn. We know nothing of what had happened to anyone outside our own small group. There was not tactical unity, no supporting weapons, just a group of invaders who were wondering what had happened to all of their thorough planning. Just before daybreak, the first gliders began to come in. One landed in a flooded area about 150 yards from where we had our perimeter set up. As the men started to come out of the glider, enemy machine gunfire opened up from the hedgerow on the other side. Men coming out of the glider were being hit. Fire was placed in the general vicinity of the machine gun and this enabled a few men to make the hedgerow behind which we had cover. About 0900 hours, Lt. Col. Ostberg, Commander 1st Battalion 507 Parachute Infantry Regiment, returned from the command post of Gen. Gavin, Assistant Division Commander, and informed us that General Gavin was moving toward La Fière and that we were to follow. This meant fording the flooded area that we had already struggled through earlier in the day. We pulled out of our position, leaving the wounded marked and as comfortable as possible and started across the marsh. As we waded in water sometimes chest deep, we were fired on by snipers, who appeared to be firing from long range because of the inaccuracy of their fire. But one couldn't help being concerned about the shots splashing water in his face. All that could be done was to keep on walking and hoping.
We made it to the other side without mishap. We marched south until we reached high ground overlooking the La Fière Bridge. When we arrived, Gen. Gavin told us we should proceed south along the railroad to Chef-du-Pont where we were to seize the town and bridge across the Merderet west of the center of town. A few men who had been able to get some automatic weapons from some of the bundles dropped as we jumped, were attached for this mission and under the command of Col. Ostberg, preceded down the railroad toward Chef-du-Pont. There were about 100 men altogether equipped only with what they could carry. Rifles, submachine guns, three machine guns and grenades of various types including the British gammon grenade which packed a terrific wallop. At about 1000 6 June Col. Ostberg and his force, comprised of men of all units of the 507th and some from the 508th had reached the railroad station of Chef-du-Pont without any opposition. The railroad station was in the center of town and the small but important bridge was a short distance southwest. A squad was sent to clear the section of town northeast of the station, which they did without incident. The remainder of the force led by Col. Ostberg started to race through the part of the town leading to the bridge. This group was fired upon from several buildings simultaneously. Four of the men were hit and the remainder was forced to hold until the town could be systematically cleared. This took about two hours. By that time, most of the Germans had withdrawn ahead of us, apparently headed for the bridge. Speed seemed to be the answer. We knew the bridge must be taken before the Germans could organize their defence so we made a semi-organized dash for it. We were too late. Two officers reached the bridge and were both shot - one toppling off the bridge and into the water. The other officer falling on the eastern approach. The officer toppling into the river was Col. Ostberg. He was rescued shortly afterward by two soldiers of the 507 and lived to fight again. The other officer was dead. A short time later, Col. Maloney arrived with about 75 more men and we set about dislodging the stubborn enemy. The railroad split the town and the bridge lay to the south and west of the railroad station. Houses lined both sides of the road leading to the bridge. A short distance from the bridge on the left side of the road leading to the bridge was a large creamery which was two stories high and afforded good observation from an upstairs window. South of the creamery and on three sides of the bridge, there were obstacles, flooded areas. For practical purposes, the only approach to the bridge was the one we had chosen through Chef-du-Pont. The approaches from the west were causeways, long and straight and completely flooded on both sides. Germans were dug in on the shoulders on both sides of the road occupying foxholes dispersed at intervals of about ten yards for a long stretch leading to the bridge and beyond. No one could hope to attack successfully or withdraw along these causeways without a preponderance of supporting fires. Something we did not have. Nevertheless, we were on the outskirts of Chef-du-Pont with 175 men. What are we waiting for? Let's take the bridge. Two attempts to storm the bridge proved unsuccessful. There had to be a better way. We did succeed in clearing the eastern side of the bridge, however, by over running the positions along the shoulders of the road.
Our own position along the edge of the road east of the bridge had become almost untenable because rifle and direct artillery fire coming from our right flank. Just as it was beginning to look as though we might have a stalemate, Col. Maloney was called back to La Fière with all men available, leaving only about 34 men at Chef-du-Pont.
Concurrent with his departure three things happened:
One, direct artillery fire on our positions around the creamery reduced our strength to 20 men; two, an observation point in the creamery noted what was estimated to be a company of Germans moving around to our left rear. This threat never materialized for they by-passed us in route to Sainte-Mère-Église where, though not known to us at the time, a battle was being waged by elements of the 505th for that important objective; three, an officer delivered a message from Gen. Gavin, «hold at all costs». It was pretty obvious that it couldn't cost much more, but at the same time, it was doubtful we could hold something we didn't have. Reinforcements were requested, and as from heaven, C-47s began to appear, dropping bundles of weapons and ammunition. One bundle of 60mm mortar ammunition dropped right in our laps. Within 30 minutes, the officer who had previously delivered the «hold at all costs» message returned with 100 men and a 57mm gun which was pulled into position on our side of the bridge. We started firing at the enemy field piece. I'm sure we didn't hit it, but we stopped the firing and that is what we had to do in order to survive.
At the beginning of this period of heavy shelling, I found myself exposed with no place to go. I spotted a very small brick sentry house just short of the bridge on our side. I made a dash for it and went inside and found a still burning enemy soldier, victim of a white phosphorous grenade, which apparently had been tossed in on him during earlier fighting. The house only had room for one man standing. So it became crowded with my arrival and the other guy in there wasn't going anywhere. This coupled with the fact that the smoke and stench from the burning man caused me to make a quick decision that I would rather take my chances out in the open than risk the consequences of smoke inhalation and besides I reasoned that this lone house was surely an aiming point for the artillery. With our reinforcements, strong positions were organized to our rear and along the flooded area on either side of the road and east of the bridge. The defences were tied in with natural obstacles on three sides of us. We opened fire with every weapon we could get into position, including our 60mm mortar. On a prearranged signal, all fires lifted and ten men and one officer stormed the bridge and went into position on the western approach to guard the causeway. Five Germans made a run for it down the death-trap causeway and were immediately shot down. That did it. The battle was over. The bridge was ours and we knew we could hold it. But as with all victories in war, we shared a let down feeling. We knew it was still a long way to Berlin. We began to organize and improve our position and tended to such pressing things as first aid to wounded, 25 in number who could not be evacuated because of a lack of any place to evacuate them. We gathered the bodies of the dead, Americans and Germans, and covered them with parachutes. D-DAY was almost over and it had gone fast and in a little while, it would be D+1. When would the beach forces come? They should have already done so. Maybe the whole invasion had failed. After all, we knew nothing of the situation except as it existed in Chef-du-Pont and Chef-du-Pont is a very small town. At 2400 hours, our fears were dispelled. Reconnaissance elements of the 4th Infantry Division wheeled into our creamery yard complete with a few rations that they shared with us. As we dug in, and made ourselves comfortable for a turn at short naps, the smell of death, which was to be with us for a long time to come, had begun to permeate the night air. It was D+1 in Normandy. As I sat pondering the day's events, having been in command subsequent to Col. Ostberg's injury, I reflected upon the details of the fighting and the bravery of every man participating in it. Some had lost their lives, some others had been seriously wounded and lay inside the creamery, perhaps wondering if they would ever be evacuated. We had done some things badly, but overall with a hodgepodge of troops from several units who had never trained together as a unit, didn't even know one another, and were engaged in their first combat, we had done okay. We captured our bridge and held it*. We knew we faced D+1 with confidence and anticipation.
Sources :
This account was written by Roy Creek shortly after WWII.
Pat O'Donnell has conducted several interviews with Col. Creek and they will be placed on the Drop Zone shortly to supplement this narrative.
*Editor's note: The other side of the causeway was seized by elements of the 508.
One of the most disastrous drops (in a night filled with disasters) occurred in Sainte-Mère-Église. Around midnight, a stray incendiary bomb had set fire to the house of Monsieur Harion, located to the east of the square.
Wakened by the mayor and the tolling of the church bell, the townspeople turned out in large numbers to form a bucket brigade supervised by members of the German garrison. (The hand pump used that night still sits on the east side of the square.) While the house continued to burn, the drone of planes could be heard over the tolling bell. The fire-fighters, looking skyward, saw ghostly silhouettes drifting down on them. Two sticks from the 1st and 2d battalions had gotten their green jump light directly over the village. Illuminated by light from the burning house and tracers from German AA guns, the paratroopers were easy targets for the Germans below. Few survived.
One who did was Private John Steele, whose parachute caught on the steeple of the church in front of you. The wounded paratrooper hung there limply for two hours, pretending to be dead, before the Germans took him prisoner.
The less fortunate hung from the trees all around the square where they had been shot. Once the fire in Monsieur Harion's house had burned itself out and the last of the paratroopers were killed or captured, the German garrison (a transportation company) quite inexplicably called it an evening and turned in.
A mile northeast of Sainte-Mère-Église, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Krause, commanding the 3d Battalion, assembled ninety men within an hour of landing and promptly ordered an advance on the village. Around dawn, the German garrison was again turned out, this time by the rattle of small-arms fire. Krause's men cleared the village in a rush, capturing thirty Germans and killing another eleven. With Sainte-Mère-Église in American hands, Krause ran a worn American flag to the top of the village flagpole, a flag that he had carried with him from Sicily.
D-Day ended with the Americans still in control of Sainte-Mère-Église, and further German attacks during the night failed to dislodge them. For their roles in the capture and defence of Sainte-Mère-Église, both Krause and Col. Vandervoort received the Distinguished Service Cross. All through 6 June, isolated groups of paratroopers were getting their first taste of hedgerow fighting within a few miles of Sainte-Mère-Église.
The Hôtel de Ville (Town Hall) is located just south of the square. In front stands a milestone marking «Kilometer O» on the «liberation route». Behind it is a stone honoring Generals Ridgway and Gavin. Inside the building is the American flag that Lieutenant Colonel Edward Krause raised over the liberated Sainte-Mère-Église. It had earlier flown over liberated Naples.
By the afternoon of the 6th, the paratroopers made contact with elements of the 4th Division moving inland from Utah Beach.
They had cut N 13 at Sainte-Mère-Église, thereby preventing the Germans from reinforcing the beach area. By their reduction of strong points at the beach exits, they greatly aided in the movement of the 4th Division off Utah Beach. Much hard fighting lay ahead to clear enemy resistance in the Carentan area, and forge a linkup between the two American beachheads. But it was apparent that Eisenhower's decision to go ahead with the night drop of the two American airborne divisions had been sound.
On one side of the square is the church (built between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries) on which Private John Steele landed. It contains two stained-glass windows commemorating the drop. There is a CD monument in front of the church. Next to it is a memorial to the 1944 mayor, Alexandre Renaud. The hand pump used to fight the fire on the night of 5-6 June still stands at the rear of the square behind the church.
This stain glass has been offered by the 505th Regiment to celebrate the 25th Anniversary.
This is the first stain glass produced by Gabriel Loir from Chartres, regrouping around the Virgin Marie, Paratroopers and planes.
This organ was given by French Companies to commemorate the 50th Anniversary.
Inside of the glider displayed in the American Airborne Museum at Sainte-Mère-Église. I highly recommend the visit of this great Museum.
One of the most confused fights took place west of the village at La Fière Bridge, over the Merderet River. Uncoordinated groups from the 505th, 507th, and 508th regiments hold the position and finally went over the bridge on the 7th. The Monument Iron Mike is overlooking the site, its twin statutes is at Fort Benning. Alongside the road is General Gavin's fox hole. The photo of flooded marshland, a common occurrence that Germans exploited, shows the conditions as they were in 1944.
Iron Mike Statue
General Gavin's fox hole at La Fière.
West of the 101st Airborne the 82d Airborne Division had gained possession of the east bank of the Merderet River in the vicinity of Sainte-Mère-Église. Occupation of these positions, however, actually fell far short of the mission assigned to the division by plan. Broadly, its mission was to assist in sealing off the peninsula from the south by destroying bridges at Pont-l'Abbé and Beuzeville-la-Bastille and securing bridgeheads across the Merderet. Thereafter the 82d was to protect the southwest flank of the Corps by securing the line of the Douve River. It was therefore also charged with taking the offensive to the west in the direction of Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte.
The assignments were as follows. The 505th Parachute Infantry was to land east of the Merderet River, capture Sainte-Mère-Église, seize and secure the river crossings near La Fière and Chef-du-Pont, and secure a line in the north running through Neuville-au-Plain and tying in with the 101st Airborne Division in the vicinity of Bandienville or Beuzeville-au-Plain. The 507th and 508th Parachute Infantry Regiments were to land west of the river to consolidate the two bridgeheads o the west bank. More specifically, the 507th was to assist the 505th in securing the La Fière bridgehead and then establish a defensive line running southwest from Gourbesville to Renouf. The 508th was to destroy the crossings of the Douve at Beuzeville-la-Bastille and Pont-l'Abbé and extend the 507th's defensive line south from Renouf. Both regiments were to be prepared to assume the offensive westward and secure the line of the Douve River. All these forces were to land by parachute and were initially under the command of Brig. Gen. James A. Gavin, assistant division commander. General Ridgway, commanding the 82d Division, was to come in with certain glider elements just before dawn on D-Day. The remaining glider artillery and infantry were to follow over a period of thirty-six hours to support the 508th Parachute Infantry in destruction of the Douve bridges. There was also a seaborne force made up of organic and attached artillery, tank destroyers, and other special units under Brig. Gen. Reese M. Howell. The drop of the 82d Airborne Division was far from good. The regiments assigned to the zones west of the Merderet had the worst drop in the entire operation. The 507th Parachute Infantry was to land in Drop Zone T, north of Amfreville, but was scattered widely. The 508th Parachute Infantry was to land southwest of Amfreville and north of Picauville, and had a slightly better drop. But many of its sticks came down east of the Merderet, and for some days many of its men fought with the 101st Airborne Division. In contrast with the other two regiments, the 505th Parachute Infantry, landing northwest of Sainte-Mère-Église between the railroad and the main highway, had one of the best drops of any airborne unit. About 1,000 of the 2,200 men landed in the drop zone, and most of the others, although scattered to the north and east, were able to assemble rapidly. They were fortunate to come down in an area nearly devoid of enemy. Rapid assembly of the regiment enabled it to proceed expeditiously with its mission-one that during the day became more important defensively than the plan has envisaged at La Fière Causeway. The events of Sainte-Mère-Église assumed a greater significance in view of the critical situation which developed along the Merderet. There, more than anywhere else, the well-laid plans miscarried with a far-reaching impact Sacks of 2-pound plastic explosive, point detonated, used as antitank weapons.
La Fière Merderet Bridge
Securing La Fière and Chef-du-Pont bridges from the east was the assigned mission of the 1st Battalion, both Parachute Infantry. Company A was to seize the one at La Fière. This company, along with the rest of the battalion, had an excellent drop and effected a remarkably rapid assembly, moving to its objective immediately.
On the other side of the river the 507th Parachute Infantry and the 508th Parachute Infantry, with the mission of securing the west bank of the river, probably depended more than any other units on a good drop pattern for success. Both regiments, however, were scattered and faced some of the most difficult problems of assembly of any of the airborne units.
Merderet River
The two regiments came in between 0230 and 0300, as scheduled. Pathfinders preceding them had in many cases found it impossible to mark the drop zones north of Amfreville and Picauville because of the presence of the enemy. Momentarily puzzled by the failure to see marker lights and by the realization that it was necessary to rely on alternative signals like the Eureka, pilots in some cases overshot the drop zones. Large numbers of paratroopers thus landed in the watery marshes along the Merderet. Aerial photos had indicated that the Merderet was a fairly narrow stream bordered with grassy swampland. But the photos were deceptive in that they did not reveal the wide flood areas created by the closing of the la Barquette lock. Grass had grown out of the water so thickly that from above this shallow lake looked like a prairie. Paratroops, heavily laden with equipment, found themselves in water several feet deep. The whole problem of assembly and recovery of equipment was therefore complicated. Both regiments were also widely dispersed. Part of the 508th Parachute Infantry dropped east of the Merderet and operated with the 101st Airborne Division. The 507th Parachute Infantry dropped generally east of its assigned zone, but personnel were found in widely separated places in the entire peninsula. Small groups held out against the enemy for several days, isolated from the rest of the division.
At first there was a noticeable gravitation to the La Fière bridge area, and ultimately elements of four regiments, including the 325th Glider Infantry, had a hand in the establishment of the bridgehead. This convergence on La Fière was due in part to the tendency of the groups landing in the Merderet marshes to collect at or move toward the railroad. The railroad embankment rose prominently from the marshland and was a convenient orientation feature. The men knew it was the only railroad in the Merderet valley and naturally used it as a guide. Probably the first group to do so was the one led by Capt. F. V. Schwartzwalder. His group of men from the 507th Parachute Infantry had landed along the swamp east of the Merderet and assembled on the railroad embankment. They moved down to the La Fière bridge and met their first opposition there at daylight. In an orchard near the group of houses east of the bridge, they were fired on by mortar and small arms. Several attempts to rush the houses netted only casualties. The engagement thus begun involved, in the course of the day, groups from all three parachute regiments. Company A, 505th Parachute Infantry, which had assembled almost to a man in the drop zone near Sainte-Mère-Église, was already engaged on the right of Captain Schwartzwalder's unit. Next on the scene were men of the 507th and 508th under Col. Roy Lindquist, Commanding Officer, 508th Parachute Infantry. Colonel Lindquist, after landing in the swamps northeast of Amfreville, moved to the railroad embankment, assembling a hundred men as he went along. On reaching the railroad, he was joined by thirty men of the 507th under Lt. John H. Wisner, regimental S-2. Lieutenant Wisner wished to reach the regimental assembly area in the vicinity of Amfreville. Colonel Lindquist's objective was Pont-l'Abbé. Both planned to follow the railroad as the clearest route south, and to cross the river at La Fière if the bridge was taken.
They arrived at dawn at the intersection of the railroad and the highway from Sainte-Mère-Église west, to find Company A, 505th Parachute Infantry, moving toward the bridge. The company was deployed to the north of the road and Colonel Lindquist decided to move up abreast. Lieutenant Wisner's men, leading off, were stopped by machine-gun fire 300 yards east of the bridge. At about the same point Company A, also pinned down by enemy fire, tried unsuccessfully to outflank the German positions from the right. About that time Lieutenant Wisner, reconnoitering to the north, ran across another group making its way to La Fière. This new group numbered about 300 men, principally from the 507th Parachute Infantry, who had assembled, like so many others, north of La Fière and had followed the railroad south. Part had been collected by General Gavin, and part by Lt. Col. Arthur Maloney and Lt. Col. Edwin J. Ostberg. General Gavin's initial intention, after assembly, was to move this force south against the west end of the La Fière bridge and causeway. However, fruitless efforts to retrieve a jeep and an antitank gun from the marshes delayed the move until daylight. With the light, enemy fire seemed to build up along the west bank. The original plan was therefore abandoned and the force proceeded east and thence south along the railroad embankment.
Marcus Heim in 1944. Note the Paratrooper Infantry Regiment Insignia of the 505th on the beret. Marcus Heim with some of his Comrades and Officers awarded by General Omar Bradley. Marcus is to the right, next to the left is Col. Vanndervoort with a walking stick.
When this force arrived at La Fière, the first American attempt to approach the bridge had been checked, but still it did not appear that the enemy was strong. Moreover, men of the 507th and 508th continued to drift into the position until by midmorning some 500 to 600 had gathered there. General Gavin therefore decided to commit part of the force elsewhere. Colonel Maloney was sent south with seventy-five men to reconnoiter another crossing. A little later General Gavin and Colonel Ostberg took another group of seventy-five men to try to cross the Merderet at the Chef-du-Pont bridge, which had been reported undefended. Colonel Lindquist took command of the assorted units remaining at La Fière. The principal organized groups, comprising about 400 men of all regiments, were Company B, 508th Parachute Infantry; Company G, 507th Parachute Infantry; and Company A, 505th Parachute Infantry. Company G, under Captain Schwartzwalder, in position on the extreme left, south of the road, had probed out the weakest portion of the enemy line but had not followed up the advantage. When Colonel Lindquist ordered an attack at noon by all forces, Company A, which had displaced to the north of the road, failed to get the order, but Lindquist's own force, attacking through the area where Company A had been held all morning, destroyed or captured the last of the enemy. As the fire fell away, Captain Schwartzwalder's men crossed the causeway and made contact near the west end with a patrol from the 2d Battalion, 507th Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col. Charles J. Timmes).
The 2d Battalion, 507th Parachute Infantry, had achieved an early assembly of fifty men under Colonel Timmes 1,000 yards east of Amfreville, near the battalion's planned drop zone. Soon after the initial assembly a patrol under Lt. Lewis Levy of Company D was sent to investigate the La Fière causeway and to clear it if possible. The patrol found a few men of the 507th already established in the village of Canquigny, though enemy infantry held the ground south and east. The forces joined but were unable to work their way to the causeway until the attack from the east bank carried across. The success of that attack cleared the west bank and brought eighty men into the bridgehead. Lieutenant Levy then established contact with the forces still on the east side and received assurance that the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, was coming across to take over the bridge.
The position seemed secure. Yet within the next hour the bridge was lost. The Germans countered quickly. Enemy artillery began to hit the vicinity of Canquigny, while small-arms fire built up to the south; tanks were heard approaching from the west. Before these signs of coming battle had become critical, Captain Schwartzwalder had decided that his primary mission was to go on toward Amfreville to join the 2d Battalion and, under prodding of the first enemy artillery bursts, had pulled out fast with his eighty men and some additional personnel of the 508th. As no other troops from the east bank crossed over, this move left the bridgehead in the hands of four officers (including Lieutenant Levy) and eight enlisted men. With grenades and rifles and one machine gun, this handful of men fought off the enemy and even succeeded in disabling two enemy tanks with Gammon grenades, but they finally had to withdraw northward to join the 2d Battalion of the 507th.
In the meantime, Company B, 508th Parachute Infantry, had been sent, belatedly, across the causeway. When it arrived on the west bank it met the enemy attack head on. Unable to organize or hold its ground, it was forced south along the river, and survivors swam back under fire to the east bank.
The bridge so handily won was thus lost through failure to consolidate rapidly the west bank position. The reason for the failure was in part that the groups participating in the action had only a vague idea of what neighboring units were doing. The hedgerow country virtually penned each unit in its separate field of action.
Not only had the bridge been lost, but the enemy counterattack had isolated the force under Colonel Timmes (now including Captain Schwartwalder's men) from the units at La Fière. Colonel Timmes' group had taken up a defensive position in an orchard near Amfreville and was caught and virtually immobilized by the enemy forces attacking toward the bridgehead. An attack south to La Fière was planned for that night but not attempted. The force numbered about 120 men; many were exhausted or casualties; and, in addition, friendly artillery fire began to fall in the causeway area. Colonel Timmes' force remained isolated in this position for two more days.
At La Fière, after the retreat of Company B, 508th Parachute Infantry, the position on the east bank was reorganized. Men of the 507th and 508th Regiments under Colonel Lindquist were relieved on the left and the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 505th, joined Company A in the line. Colonel Lindquist's men were placed in reserve west of the railroad. But the position was still far from satisfactory. The forward defences of the 1st Battalion, 505th, were exposed to heavy mortar and artillery fire, and the enemy, after his success in clearing the west bank, began to show unusual aggressiveness. Two German tanks attempted to exploit their success by crossing the causeway. Company A's road block covered by bazooka men stopped the attack, destroying both tanks. But it seemed probable that the Germans would try again. General Gavin came up to La Fière from Chef-du-Pont late in the afternoon and found the situation serious. Ammunition was low; medical aid was scarce. General Gavin sent orders to Colonel Maloney at Chef-du-Pont to bring all his force, less about a platoon, to La Fière at once.
Before Colonel Maloney arrived, the enemy attacked the east bank again in considerable strength, and the position of the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, was, in the opinion of its commander, becoming rapidly untenable. At about 2000 Colonel Maloney brought 200 men to La Fière and moved up to the 505th Parachute Infantry line. By dark the American defence was again fairly well stabilized and the enemy had ceased his attack across the causeway.
Locally the situation was secure. But there was still no news at 82d Airborne Division headquarters, located west of Sainte-Mère-Église, of the progress of the seaborne invasion. General Ridgway therefore took steps to provide for the possibility that the whole division might have to consolidate its defence in the vicinity of Sainte-Mère-Église. Colonel Lindquist was ordered to move his force, now numbering some 250 men, to a position from which he could prevent the enemy from cutting off La Fière units from Sainte-Mère-Église. This movement, however, was not accomplished until the next day.
While the chief concern of the 82d Airborne Division during D-Day was with the La Fière bridgehead, where the bulk of the assembled forces were committed and where the enemy put up his strongest resistance, another attempt to secure a crossing of the Merderet River had been made at the same time to the south of Chef-du-Pont and had fared slightly better. The initial attack at Chef-du-Pont had been undertaken by the seventy-five men under Colonel Ostberg. The enemy withdrew from the town and the eastern approaches to the bridge but dug in along the causeway and on the west bank. Though apparently not numerous, the Germans fought tenaciously. Colonel Ostberg's men were stopped at the bridge. The seventy-five reinforcements who arrived later under Colonel Maloney could do nothing to break the deadlock. At about 1700 the Chef-du-Pont force was stripped to a platoon in order to send reinforcements to the hard-pressed paratroopers at La Fière.
The remaining platoon of thirty-four men under Capt. Roy E. Creek almost at once were whittled down to twenty effectives by direct fire from an enemy field piece on the opposite bank. At the same time from seventy- five to one hundred Germans were observed forming on the east bank in some buildings to the left rear of Captain Creek's position. Captain Creek asked for reinforcements. Before they could arrive, immediate help was provided fortuitously by the landing within American lines of a glider carrying a 57-mm. antitank gun and ammunition. The gun was emplaced and fired to neutralize the enemy artillery piece. Nearly one hundred men came down from La Fière shortly thereafter and the enemy threat was removed. With the reinforcements a defensive position was organized to bring greater fire power to bear on the enemy. In a short time the east bank was cleared, and a platoon crossed the bridge and dug in on the other side without opposition. The bridge was secured, though the position remained enfiladed by enemy fire from the Carquebut area.
The capture of Sainte-Mère-Église, and the fights for the Merderet River crossings at La Fière and Chef-du-Pont, together constituted the principal efforts of the 82d Airborne Division on D-Day. But there were also a number of isolated groups of the division which organized themselves west of the Merderet and fought independently-in some cases for four or five days. These isolated groups contributed in some degree to the accomplishment of the division's missions, though they carried on what amounted to fights for survival rather than battles for planned objectives.
Col. George V. Millet, Jr., commanding the 507th Parachute Infantry, collected in the course of D-Day some seventy-five men northwest of Amfreville. But, though he was not more than 1,000 yards from the 2d Battalion, 507th (Colonel Timmes), he made no contact with this battalion or other friendly elements until D plus 4.
Farther south, elements of the 508th Parachute Infantry were having similar experiences. One group, initially led by Lt. Gerald P. Guillot and later by Capt. Jonathan Adams, had one skirmish after another with the enemy, and survived to join the regiment on D plus 5.
The largest force from the 508th Parachute Infantry to assemble west of the Merderet was commanded by Col. Thomas J. B. Shanley (Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion). Colonel Shanley landed near Picauville. He assembled a small group, not large enough to proceed, as he wished, on the mission against the Douve bridge at Pont-l'Abbé. Before noon he established radio contact with Lt. Norman McVicar, who had a force of about sixty men a mile to the northeast, and started out to join this force. He met a patrol from another force off to his left under Maj. Shields Warren, Jr. Junction between these three groups, however, was delayed by enemy pressure on the south, which forced Colonel Shanley's men to engage. It was mid-afternoon before they could free themselves even so far as to choose better ground and organize a defensive position. Before nightfall, however, the enemy had been cleared sufficiently to allow the Shanley, Warren, and McVicar forces to join. But in the meantime Colonel Shanley had learned that the German force which had been trying all afternoon to close in on him had the strength of a battalion, and that more of the enemy was dug in around Pont-l'Abbé. He therefore abandoned the idea of attacking toward the Douve bridge and decided to proceed to the regiment's assembly area, the high ground known as Hill 30, dominating the Chef-du-Pont causeway. At 2300 the entire force, organized into two companies, moved there and improvised an all-around defensive position.
Charles N. DeGlopper
Rank and organization: Private First Class, U.S. Army, Co. C, 325th Glider Infantry, 82d Airborne Division. Place and date: Merderet River at La Fière, France, 9 June 1944. Entered service at: Grand Island, N.Y. Birth: Grand Island, N.Y. G.O. No.: 22, 28 February 1946.
He was a member of Company C, 325th Glider Infantry, on 9 June 1944 advancing with the forward platoon to secure a bridgehead across the Merderet River at La Fière, France. At dawn the platoon had penetrated an outer line of machineguns and riflemen, but in so doing had become cut off from the rest of the company. Vastly superior forces began a decimation of the stricken unit and put in motion a flanking maneuver which would have completely exposed the American platoon in a shallow roadside ditch where it had taken cover. Detecting this danger, Pfc. DeGlopper volunteered to support his comrades by fire from his automatic rifle while they attempted a withdrawal through a break in a hedgerow 40 yards to the rear. Scorning a concentration of enemy automatic weapons and rifle fire, he walked from the ditch onto the road in full view of the Germans, and sprayed the hostile positions with assault fire. He was wounded, but he continued firing. Struck again, he started to fall; and yet his grim determination and valiant fighting spirit could not be broken. Kneeling in the roadway, weakened by his grievous wounds, he levelled his heavy weapon against the enemy and fired burst after burst until killed outright. He was successful in drawing the enemy action away from his fellow soldiers, who continued the fight from a more advantageous position and established the first bridgehead over the Merderet. In the area where he made his intrepid stand his comrades later found the ground strewn with dead Germans and many machineguns and automatic weapons which he had knocked out of action. Pfc. DeGlopper's gallant sacrifice and unflinching heroism while facing unsurmountable odds were in great measure responsible for a highly important tactical victory in the Normandy Campaign.
At dawn on the 6th June 1944 Cauquigny, a small village in the commune of Amfreville, was not looking for a claim to fame. This site become, one of the most important targets of the bridgehead. It was the gateways to the west, opening onto the causeway of La Fière and the point at which the operation to cut off the Cotentin Peninsular from the mainland was to commence.. The future of the US bridgehead would centre here at the Chapel of Cauquigny.
The responsibility for this operation was entrusted to Lt. Col. Timmes, Commander of the 2nd Bn of the 507th Regt, Inf. Paratroopers, of the 82nd Airborne Division. At dawn, he arrived at Cauquigny with a patrol of paratroopers, looked around and noted that everything was quiet. Later in the morning, while he was in a position 800 yards to the north, near the hamlet Les Heutes, he sent Lt Levy and Lt Kormylo from his Bn to secure this bridge. During the morning, Capt. Schwartzwalder and Lt. Marr, from the 3rd Bn, took part in the battle on the east ridge of the Merderet to take the Manor of La Fière. At the same time, General Gavin, with Lt. Col. Ostberg and Maloney, commanders of the first and third Bn respectively of 507th Regt. Went south of Chef du Pont. Here, during the day of the 6th June, the Germans counter-attacked with tanks and a large infantry force. The fighting was furious and the small force of paratroopers quickly realise that they would not be able to hold out for long. Very soon, the ammunition began running out and it became necessary to retreat. Cauquigny was lost! Three days later, General Ridgeway and Gavin decided that the hamlet had to be retaken. In fact, it was decided to make a frontal attack against the Germans, with the support of artillery. On June 9th 1944, at 10.30 am the artillery barrage began and at 10.45 am under cover of a smoke screen, the 3rd Bn of the 325th Airborne Regt started the attack from La Fière bridge to get across the 500 yards of road to Cauquigny. Under a hail of fire, from machine guns, mortars and field artillery the attack was partly repulsed. At this moment, General Gavin ordered Capt. Rae of the 507th Regt to attack and succeed at all costs Much equipment was destroyed and many dead and wounded littered the road. Despite this, the heroism, courage and the vigorous onslaught surprised the enemy, who retreated, losing ground in their turn. The attack by Capt. Rae and his men was decisive. Cauquigny was never lost again. The advance of the 507th Regt did not stop here, it continued to the small village of Motey, 2/3 of a mile west. This operation enabled the bridgehead to be widened north and south.
Following this brilliant action, the enemy was defeated and the passage for the sea-borne forces from the beach was finally opened up.
This new monument to the 507th is one of the more recent additions, and long overdue, only being unveiled on the 23rd July 2002 by the American Ambassador to France, the hon. Howard R. Leach. The monument was paid for by the veterans of the 507th and their supporters. It is quite unusual as the land was purchased, the monument erected, and the upkeep of the site are all being funded from America. The monument was designed by Charles Smith (pictured next to the monument) who is based in Florida and was it executed by a local sculptor in Valognes.
During the inauguration ceremony an empty chair was left at the base of the monument to represent the many Paratroopers who could not be there, many losing their lives in the countryside around the monument. A colour guard drawn from the both American and French troops presented the two countries flags.
The story of the 507th is told on panels around the site. The aim of the 507th on D-day was to capture the bridges over the Merderet river, but the regiment was scattered over a wide area, mostly to the north west and south west of the intended drop area. This was due to a combination of events. The C47 pilots being inexperienced flew too high and too fast after flying into enemy flak and many parachutists were dropped in the wrong place.
The river Merderet also had been flooded by the Germans and instead of a river the parachutists found themselves landing in or around a lake.
The bunkers are located in the field bordered by road Pvt Criss towards Saint-Martin-de-Vareville. The farm is at the opposite, D 423 towards Turqueville. The action took place in a group of farms that was the scene of a memorable D-Day firefight.
In 1944, the farm buildings had been pressed into service as a barracks complex for German artillerymen. On American maps they were simply given the designation «WXYZ». Today, there is nothing along this bucolic country road to recall for the traveller the events of 6 June. Yet here, Staff Sergeant Harrison Summers, 1st Battalion, 502d Parachute Infantry, fought almost single-handedly to capture the barracks.
Summers had been given fifteen men to accomplish his mission, one that really called for a battalion effort. Strangers to Summers and coming from different units, these men had little stomach for the firefight the sergeant was about to begin. Trusting that his example would inspire his men, Summers raced over to the first building, kicked in the door, and sprayed the room with his Thompson submachine gun. The handful of survivors burst out of the rear of the building, looking for cover further down the road. Summers, now covered by Private William Burt with a light machine gun, broke into a second house and shot its six defenders.
And so it went from house to house. Two officers who joined him were taken out by German fire almost immediately. Private John Camien, carrying an M-1 carbine, pitched in later. The rest of Summers's squad provided some covering fire from . the ditch paralleling the road. But it was largely Summers's fight. Building after building fell to the intrepid sergeant. The finale came after five hours of fighting, when Summers and Burt set the last barracks building on fire with bazooka rounds and tracers, flushing the eighty or so German defenders into an open field where fifty were killed. When asked how he felt, Summers, dragging on a cigarette, replied that he didn't feel «very good. It was all kind of crazy».
«La Londe Airfield», named A6, was constructed by the 819th Engineers Battalion and began on June 8th 1944. It was operational rapidly due the number of bulldozers which transformed the fields in an air base.
Col. Bt. Kleine, commander of the 371st Combat Group, composed of 3 squadrons (404, 405, 406) originally based at Bisterne England were taking care of this airstrip. The run way was 1525 yards long by 37 yards wide and use till September 18th 1944.
La Londe air cover was provided by the 552nd Anti Aircraft Artillery from the 78th DI. The four batteries were commanded by Col. Bm. Warfield. The HQ was at Mauger's farm whose owners had to leave. That squadron was mostly equipped with P47 Thunderbolts and P51 Mustangs, plus several other planes like Douglas C 47 for supplies and Lightning P43.
In the night of June 5th to June 6th 1944, the German Wilhem Falley, Commander of 91st infantry division, was in Rennes with his aide de camp, Major Joachim Bartuzat, for a kriegspiel (war-game). He was alerted by his HQ in Picauville that US Paratroopers landed in the Cherbourg Peninsula, right away he decided to head back. Arriving to Château Bernaville in Picauville, he met an American patrol who ordered him to stop. The driver tried to drive through the paratroopers, but the gun fire was too much. The car hit the wall of the old mill. J. Bartuza was killed immediately and Gen. Falley jumped out of the car and tried to reach his gun. He tried to hide by the door-way of a barn. Brannen pointed his gun at General Falley who kept moving and shot him dead. The body of the General was only found 48 hours later by his own men.
The loss of General Falley was disastrous for the German counterattack against the American Airborne forces.
Gen. Falley's HQ.
His HQ Commanded:
Linked up units 6.6.44 :
Later on in the campaign, the division was combined with 243rd Inf.Div under the command of Oberst Bernhard Klosterkemper. In early July 1944, it received a new commander in the shape of Oberst Eugen Koenig.
The two men were provisionally buried at Bernaville. At the end of the war, the corpses were transferred to German Cemetery in Orglandes.
Lt. M. Brannen, Commanded by Jack Schlegel of 3rd Bn of 508 PIR under Col. Roy Lindquist, remembers his great action: «From my position above the dusty, dirt road I saw the German Caporal trying to escape by crawling into the cellar of the house and I fire my Colt pistol at him grazing his shoulder and saw him sit down beside the house, here our enlisted men attended his slight wound. I also watched a German officer crawling in the road towards his lüger lying in the road several feet in front of his position. He looked at me as I stood on the hedge above him, and 15 feet to his right, and as he inched closer and closer to his weapon he pleaded to me in German and also saying in English «DON'T KILL, DON'T KILL». I thought «I'm not a cold hearted killer. I'm human... but if he gets that lüger - it is either him or me or one more of my men». So I shot. He was hit in the forehead and never knew it».
I highly recommend this visit. Take an hour or so to discover an amazing number of bunkers, which were buried for years after the war and finally exhumed by the landowner. This fortified complex contained casemates housing 210-mm guns which easily reached Utah Beach. Despite shelling from large-caliber guns and repeated infantry assaults, the battery held out until 12 June, all the while harassing landing operations. It was the one major battery in the lodgement area that actually became a factor in the post-D-Day battle.
German Crisbecq Battery.
The casemates, that housed four French 105-mm guns, flank the road just before you enter the village. The casemates are not open to visitors.
After withstanding attacks from the 22d Infantry for two days, the battery surrendered after a flamethrower, triggered by Private Ralph G. Riley, set off ammunition inside one of the casemates. Riley was awarded the Silver Star for his single-handed attack.
Azeville, Casemates.
By the end of June a camp for 20,000 German prisoners was established, which finally was extended to 40,000 men including 18 Generals and 6 Admirals. The Camp was commanded by Lt. Col. Kennedy.
Foucarville prisonners camp
This CCE was almost a town, with hospital, prison, churches, theatre, pub, bakery etc... The total surface was 306 acres including 48 acres of garden, circumference 3.2 miles, roads and side walks 3.9 miles, barbe wired fences 180 miles, water pipe lines 24 miles, high voltage line 19 miles, communication lines 64 miles, phone installed 275, squad tents 1100, pyramidal tents 370, 50 kitchen... Unfortunately nothing subsists today apart a barn made with field stones use as explosive storage and use as private living home today.
Les Dunes-de-Varreville (WN 10), the original D-Day landing objective of the 4th Division.
In 1944, this area was strongly defended, and many of the original blockhouses still squat ominously amid the dunes.
Today, the site is marked by a monument, a Sherman tank with French insignia which commemorate the 1 August landing of the 2d French Armored Division, a half-track and an armored car M18.
«General Omar N. Bradley called the assault landing on Utah Beach «a piece of cake», and it was, compared to that on Omaha».
General Omar N. Bradley called the assault landing on Utah Beach «a piece of cake», and it was, compared to that on Omaha. The landing plan called for the 4th Infantry Division (Major General Raymond O. Barton) to land along 2,200 yards of sandy beach on a two-regiment front, two battalions abreast. Colonel James A. Van Fleet's 8th Infantry (including the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry) was to land at 0630, followed by the 22d Infantry in eighty-five minutes and the 12th Infantry at 1030.
DD tanks were to lead the way in, preceded by an intense naval and air bombardment. Various engineer units were scheduled to land close behind the infantry to clear beach obstructions and to blow gaps in the low sea wall paralleling the beach.
The landing of the thirty-two DD tanks was delayed when one of the control ships was sunk by a mine. Four of the tanks were lost when the LCT carrying them sank before they could be launched. In contrast to the heavy losses off Omaha, twenty-eight DD's made it to the beach able to provide fire support for the infantry already ashore.
Rank and organization: brigadier general, U.S. Army. Place and date: Normandy invasion, 6 June 1944. Entered service at: Oyster Bay, N.Y. Birth: Oyster Bay, N.Y. G.O. No.: 77, 28 September 1944.
For gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty on 6 June 1944, in France. After 2 verbal requests to accompany the leading assault elements in the Normandy invasion had been denied, Brig. Gen. Roosevelt's written request for this mission was approved and he landed with the first wave of the forces assaulting the enemy-held beaches. He repeatedly led groups from the beach, over the seawall and established them inland. His valor, courage, and presence in the very front of the attack and his complete unconcern at being under heavy fire inspired the troops to heights of enthusiasm and self-sacrifice. Although the enemy had the beach under constant direct fire, Brig. Gen. Roosevelt moved from one locality to another, rallying men around him, directed and personally led them against the enemy. Under his seasoned, precise, calm, and unfaltering leadership, assault troops reduced beach strong points and rapidly moved inland with minimum casualties. He thus contributed substantially to the successful establishment of the beachhead in France.
The strong offshore current carried the first wave of infantry some 2,000 yards south, causing the boats to beach in front of the German strong point at La Grande Dune (a half-mile south of your present location). Fortunately, the defences there were much weaker than those on the intended beach, due in part to visual bombing by the medium bombers of the IX Bomber Command and naval fire support.
The point blank bombardment by the B-26's was a crucial factor in the success at Utah beach, in contrast to the pre-1st wave bombardment at Omaha.
Roosevelt, Theodore, Jr., Grave
Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, assistant division commander, landed with the first wave, the only general officer to do so on D-Day. Shortly after coming ashore, Roosevelt, disregarding his personal safety, surveyed the beach before him and made two decisions that decisively influenced the course of the battle. Realizing that he and the first wave had landed a mile south of their assigned beach, he ordered the following waves to come in on this new beach. Emphasizing that decision for Colonel Eugene Caffey of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, he said, «We're going to start the war from here». He then ordered the advance inland to begin immediately along the causeway leading to Beach Exit 2, directly to his front. For his heroism that morning, Roosevelt was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.
The 101st had just freed Carentan on June 12th and were expecting a German counter-attack which happens the next day, Enemy paratroopers of the 37th Regiment belong the 17th SS started the assault. They were commanded by LT. Col. Von der Heydte; fortunately their progression was stopped by the American paratroopers supported by the 2nd Armoured Division commanded by General Ross, at the end of the day the new front line was pushed south of Méautis. This is also the village were General Theodore Roosevelt died on July 12th as you will see on the plaque.
The 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, quickly passed across the flooded area behind the beach to higher ground (along the road you have just driven to reach La Madeleine). The 2d Battalion moved along the beach to the south and opened up Exit 1 to Pouppeville and Sainte-Marie-du-Mont. Three battalions of the 22d Infantry moved north to clear opposition from Exit 4. Before dark, the 1st and 2d battalions of the 22d Infantry had linked up with the 502d Parachute Infantry west of Saint-Germain-de-Varreville. Late afternoon also found the 2d and 3d battalions, 8th Infantry, astride route N 13 at Les Forges, but they had failed to link up with the 505th Parachute Infantry holding Sainte-Mère-Église two miles to the north. By then, the first elements of the 90th Infantry Division had come ashore. The landing on Utah Beach was becoming the big success story of D-Day.
In addition to a D-Day museum, La Madeleine is the site of these monuments:
The first (designated 00) of the 1182 cylindrical milestones marking the «Voie de la Liberté», the route that the U.S. Third Army followed from Normandy to Bastogne. All bear forty-eight stars and a symbolic torch of liberty patterned after that held aloft by «Liberty» in New York harbor. They are similar to the stones which line La Voie Sacrée (the Sacred Way), the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun along which hundreds of thousands of French soldiers moved in 1916. A monument to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, raised in 1945 atop a blockhouse of the W5 strongpoint. This massive blockhouse, captured on D-Day and used as the Brigade HQ, contains a memorial crypt (protected by a locked iron grill) commemorating the members of the Brigade who died on Utah Beach. Another plaque commemorates Maj. General Eugene Mead Caffey and the achievements of the Brigade he commanded. Other plaques in French and English commemorate the assault on Utah Beach.
An imposing stone plinth, unveiled by General J. Laughton Collins on 5 June 1984, commemorating «in humble tribute... its sons who lost their lives in the liberation of these beaches, June 6, 1944».
A stone plaque marking the presence of the heads of state of the United States, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands for the 40th anniversary of D-Day.
A stone plaque commemorating General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander.
Some fifty-nine road signs named after members of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade who died in the fighting on Utah Beach.
Fourteen highly visible plaques (text in French) are scattered through Sainte-Marie-du-Mont that tell the story of the D-Day events at those sites.
June 6, 1944, Normandy.
One of the dawn objectives of the U.S. 506th PIR was to secure the town of Sainte-Marie-du-Mont.
Early that morning, German Col. Von der Heydte used the church steeple to view the invasion at Normandy from Saint-Côme-du-Mont and not Sainte-Marie-du-Mont as often said and subsequently ordered his 1st Battalion to occupy and hold Sainte-Marie-du-Mont. Throughout the morning, various groups of paratroopers tried to take the town, but were beaten back by intense mortar fire, directed by an observer in the church. Eventually the observer was spotted and taken out by a captured piece of German artillery. Subsequently, elements of the U.S. 3rd Battalion, 8th Infantry and C Company, 70th Tank Battalion moved in to take the town. This scenario attempts to capture some of the flavor of that historical engagement.
(Note: History and some scenario elements and inspiration are credited to the book, «Skirmish Campaigns, Normandy '44 - First Hours», by Scott Fisher and Nathan Forney.)
North of Sainte-Mère-Église, the 505th's 2d Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Vandervoort, landed in its assigned drop zone and quickly assembled 575 of its 650 members. After some initial communications confusion (working radios were in short supply that morning), Vandervoort, who had broken his ankle on landing, ordered the bulk of his men to fall back on Sainte-Mère-Église. He left Lieutenant Turner B. Turnbull and a platoon of forty-one to hold Neuville, two kilometers to the north.
Turnbull, a half-Cherokee known as the «Chief» to his men, had hardly deployed his troopers to either side of the road when they were attacked by a company of the 1058th Grenadier Regiment, 91st Division, supported by a self-propelled gun and a tank. Turnbull ordered a fighting retreat a move Vandervoort had tried to signal him earlier and sixteen of the original forty-two troopers reached American lines. Turnbull and his men had bought eight hours, giving Colonel William Ekman, commanding the 505th, time to consolidate his position around Sainte-Mère-Église. In the late morning, the enemy attacked along N 13 from the south, only to be driven back and counterattacked in turn by Company L, 2d Battalion.
A German assault was expected from north, so when the 2nd bn proceeded to Neuville, after they captured the village their task was to build up a special welcome for the enemy forces. Lt. Col Vanderhoort had confidence in Turner experience from Sicily and North Africa.
His men from 35 to 42 get into position to form up an ambush. The unit was lightly armed; with only a machine gun, a bazooka team, a few Browning automatic rifles and the rest regular rifles it was hardly a match for taking on the best the German 1058th Grenadier Regiment could throw at them. Soon they could see in the dark at about 400 yards away some movement, ahead was a French biker who told Turner that Americans were escorting a German column of prisoner, but all of them were speaking German!!! He order to one of his machine gunner to do a side salvo to check the French men barware's.
The whole column scattered to side ditches and counter fire Turner's position. The German ruse was discovered. Machine gunner Sgt. Bob Niland (buried at the cemetery side by side with his brother, Remember Saving Private Ryan) volunteered to cover them, but was killed before he could reach his gun. Pvt. Sebastian also volunteered to cover them with a Browning automatic rifle. The small uinit hold the position facing about 200 Germans.
One of the most poignant sites is the village of Graignes. Two battalions of American paratroopers were mistakenly dropped near this village. Helped by the villagers, they decided to resist, even though the town had no strategic value. They were finally overrun by 1,500 Germans 5 days later. Many escaped with the help of the villagers, but the wounded remained in the church under the care of the clergy and others.
Unfortunately for the towns people and the wounded Americans, an SS regiment appeared and executed all the wounded and many of the villagers including three priests. The church was left in ruins and is now a monument to the fighting. There are plaques on the crumbled walls with the names of the villagers who were executed next to the names of the Americans who died under their protection. I had a hard time keeping my composure when I was there.
«All the wounded and many of the villagers including three priests were executed»
On July 6.1944 Shortly after the morning briefing at Braemar House, Salisbury, Patton's final headquarters in England, a drive with Col Codman to the nearest airstrip. General Patton looked at his watch. «Ten-twenty-five», he said. «Exactly a year ago to the minute we cast off from Algiers on the Monrovia for Sicily». They pass the scattered clouds, over the channel at 10.000 feet. Flight over Cherbourg. He said «Not too badly bashed up, I should say».
Soon the landing beaches appeared and showed an appalling spectacle of chaos and destruction. They landed on the narrow airstrip behind Omaha, once more the General looked at his watch. «Eleven-twenty-five», he said. «From Norfolk to Casablanca it took us eighteen days. From Algiers to Gela, Sicily, five days. And now France in one hour». He sighed. General Bradley's headquarters in a partially wooded field south of Isigny was only few miles away, but what with the endless two-way stream of trucks, weapon carriers, half-tracks, and peeps, they arrived an hour later for lunch. The General spent the afternoon conferring with General Bradley and General Hodges and later with Lightning Joe Collins.
On July 7.1944 Morning session with General Bradley and his staff, for which Monty and his Chief of Staff, General de Guingand, drove over from Bayeux.
«Do not take counsel of your fears»
After lunch the General bade them farewell and they drove off in the direction of Carentan to find their first C.P. in France. It took some finding, as General Gay and an advance party had taken pains to locate it in a thoroughly secluded apple orchard whose only approach was a narrow grass-covered lane in the bocage country southeast of the small town of Bricquebec near the village of Nehou, less that 10 miles behind First Army's front line. The ground was hard and dry, the tents nestling beneath the conveniently spaced apple trees invisible from the air. The General was pleased with the setup. But he was not going to be happy until Third Army became operational.
July 6th last figures at 6.00 am.
The VI inaccuracy
A very high proportion of the casualties, somewhere around 10 000, not always severe or mortal, has fallen upon London, which represented to the enemy a target 18 miles wide by over 20 miles deep.
On the 2 754 flying bombs launched / 2 752 civilians gets killed.
On July 17th the lay-out of buzz bomb get in place.
A fighter Belt at sea:
Coastal Gun belt:
Inland fighter belt:
Balloon belt:
On September 6th Battle of Britain was over.
A total of 8 000 VI were launched against London, about 2 400 got through.
Total civilian losses were 6 184 Killed and 17 981 seriously injured, but those figures do not tell the whole story, many injured people did not have to stay in hospital and them were unrecorded.
V2 threat.
Total casualties caused by V weapons.
In England were 2 724 killed and 6 476 seriously injured, they were causing twice as much casualties than the V1.
London was not the only V2 target, also Antwerp: 8 696, Liège: 3 141.
Launching V1s from Northern France including Normandy
Spring 1944 the war was going badly for Germany. The first V1 «doodlebugs» were not launched until June 13th - a few days after the D-Day landings. Their long launching ramps were hidden in forests or woods, but easily spotted from the air, so were rapidly bombed. The Germans switched to mobile ramps, which they moved around the Pas-de-Calais area.
Almost 9 250 V1's were fired against London, but less than 2 500 reached their target. In flight they were almost as vulnerable as their ramps: about 2 000 were destroyed by anti-aircraft gunfire; 2 000 by fighter planes, and almost 300 by barrage balloons.
